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A Tortuous Search for Justice: Notes on the Kashmir 
Conflict 
Aparna Rao 
Institut fi.ir V olkerkunde 
Universitat zu Koln 
Very few sociological or anthropological studies 
have been devoted so far to the Kashmir Valley (for 
exceptions see Madan 1989, Sanyal 1979). Numerous 
publications exist, however, on its recent history and 
politics, with the "Kashmir conflict" being focused on 
from a variety of political perspectives (cf. Bose 1997, 
Ganguly 1997, Gauhar 1998, Qureshi 1999, Rahman 
1996, Schofield 1997 for some major recent studies). 
The following preliminary observations seek to address 
this conflict by briefly considering certain aspects of 
public discourse and specific elements in the 
ideologisation and instrumentalisation of a more general 
search for justice in the Valley of Kashmir. 
July 13 1988, often considered to mark the 
beginning of the Kashmir conflict, marks only the 
beginning of a new phase in a movement which began 
in the 1920s; it augured the transition from a largely 
peaceful movement to a rather desperate armed struggle. 
This movement was referred to by Chaudhari Ghulam 
Abbas of Jammu in his presidential address to the 
Muslim Conference party in October 1935, when he 
appealed to the non-Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir to 
join the Valley Muslims in their fight for "social 
justice." Since then this movement has taken many, 
often apparently contradictory, forms. The idioms it has 
been couched in by its various protagonists, as also by 
its opponents, have also varied. The stereotyped, though 
emotionally charged metaphors used have been those of 
"nationalism" (Kashmiri, Indian), "identity" (Kashmiri), 
"Muslim unity" (Kashmir and Pakistan), "Islamic 
fundamentalism" (Pakistani), and "secularism" (Indian). 
While in the name of nationalism and secularism every 
determined political attempt to deal with the key issue 
of justice has been nipped in the bud by the Indian state, 
there has to date never been a let-up in Pakistani 
propaganda in the name of Islam and the true place of 
Kashmiris, as Muslims, in a Muslim (e.g. Pakistani) 
state. For most vocal Kashmiris, the solution has been 
perceived as lying in "self-determination" linked to the 
concept of a specific identity . · 
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Identity and Politics-The Beginnings 
The concept of a distinct Kashmiri identity 
(kashmiriyat) evolved in the 1930s when a movement, 
explicitly involving both the Muslim and Hindu 
intelligentsia, began against feudal-cum-colonial rule. 
The idea of a discrete Kashmiri citizenship goes back 
even earlier to the 1920s 1, when agitating Kashmiri 
Hindus forced the Government to formally define "State 
subjects." Although a tiny minority, certain families 
had over the centuries come to enjoy a near monopoly 
in the State's administration and were highly perturbed 
at being increasingly eased out of these positions of 
power by immigrant Punjabis, familiar with Urdu, 
which had replaced Persian as the official language. 
They now raised the issue of so-called "state" (mulki) 
and "non-state" (ghair mulki) subjects in order to 
counter the (Hindu Dogra) Maharaja Hari Singh's (1925-
1952) systematic favoring of Hindus and Sikhs from 
Jammu, Poonch, what is now Azad Kashmir and parts 
of pre-partition Punjab. In 1927 yet another law was 
passed defining "hereditary state subjects" and those not 
covered by this definition could neither hold public 
office, nor buy land. Even after this, however, most 
government jobs were largely filled, not by Kashmiris, 
but by Dogras from the Jammu area. Hari Singh's 
relations with Kashmiri Muslims was even worse. 
Although he was far from secular, he appeared at the 
I The question of locals and non-locals was a long standing 
issue, and as early as 1912 the government distinguished 
between "local" animal husbanders, who had lived and 
migrated within the state's borders for at least one 
generation -and "foreigners" who were considered 
undesirable new migrants (C.S . 1914a: 1914b; 191 4c); 
pleas from local Gujar ("Desi Gujari") notwithstanding 
(e.g. Imam Din 1924), selected grazing areas were closed to 
migratory herds owned by non-Kashmiri. By 1920 these 
measures were considered inadequate to curb further 
migration into Kashmir from the west, and a formal 
notification was passed prohibiting the entry of 
"foreigner" herders into the state's territories (C.S. 1914d). 
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time to have less strained relations with non-Kashmiri 
Muslims. Thus, for example, large numbers of soldiers 
were recruited from the Muslim Sandan and Sudhan 
communities of Mirpur and Poonch respectively 
-albeit under the command of Hindu Dogra officers-
while no Kashmiri Muslim could legally even carry 
firearms. However, corporate socio-political 
consciousness among Kashmiri Muslims already had a 
tradition of roughly seventy years (e.g. Ishaq Khan 
1998), with the first strikes and revolts in Srinagar 
against intolerable working conditions and grossly 
exploitative taxation dating back to 1847, just one year 
after the British sold the territory of Kashmir to the 
Dogra chieftain Gulab Singh. 
The 1920s and 1930s were a period of intense 
political ferment in Jammu and Kashmir (for Ladakh see 
van Beek 1998): A movement began for the 
improvement of the conditions of Muslims and for 
greater religious and political freedom. In 1929-1930 the 
Majlis-e Ahrar-e lslam-e Hind, an organization fighting 
British imperialism was founded in Lahore and soon 
after organized demonstrations in Kashmir. Parallel to 
this stream of explicitly Muslim identity ran another, 
representing economic and non-religious identity; the 
latter's concerns were voiced by several organizations, 
such as the Gujar-lat Conference,2 which succeeded in 
1927 in getting all sedentary Gujar in Jammu and 
Kashmir recognized as "state subjects". Four years later 
all nomadic Gujar of the area (cf. Rao and Casimir 
1985, Rao 1999) also achieved this status . It was 
against this backdrop that in 1931 the "Kashmir 
Agitation" began with a series of demonstrations lasting 
several weeks. They ended in November 1931 with the 
Maharaja setting up the Glancy Commission to look 
into the grievances of various communities. 
Although to the south of the Valley religion had 
always played a major role in politics, in the Valley 
religious sentiments, perceived of as opposed to those 
of kashmiriyat, never had much impact. Till the early 
2oth century there was no religious association in the 
Valley and when around 1925 the Anjuman-e Ahl-e 
Hadith, with Wahabi leanings, was set up in Srinagar it 
met with opposition from most local Muslims. Hari 
Singh's misrule coupled with the general sub-
continental trend of the period towards 
"communalisation" had, however, encouraged affiliation 
along religious lines, and gradually Hindus and 
Muslims formed their respective associations. In an 
attempt to channel popular anger and discontent along 
more coherent, non-parochial and explicitly political 
lines the Muslim Conference was formed in 1932, with 
Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, a Kashmiri as .President, 
2Although not explicitly Islamic, all members were 
Muslim, since in the entire area Gujar and Jat were Muslim 
(some of the latter were also Ahmadiya). At the time this 
was also one of the few major rural-based political 
movements in the region. Within Jammu and Kashmir the 
Gujar-Jat Collference was formed in 1935. 
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Ghulam Abbas from Jammu as General Secretary and a 
number of well known Kashmiri Hindus as members . 
Several prominent Gujar and other non-Kashmiri 
M uslims espec ially from areas south (e.g . Jammu) and 
west (e. g. Mirpur) of the Valley also joined . In sp ite of 
its name, this organi zation had secular object ives and 
aimed to fight the oppress ive regime in Jammu and 
Kashmi r. Soon, however, Sheikh Abdu ll ah 's stress on 
secularism and also certain sectarian differences led to a 
split, and notably to Yusuf Shah, the then Minvai z of 
Kashmir, leaving the organizat ion . 
In 1936, partly as a reaction to the s till prevailing 
religious polarization but partly because Sheikh 
Abdullah appeared too socialistic and radical to many, a 
regional Congress Party3 was organized in Jammu and, 
aga in both Kashmiri and non-Kashmiri, Muslims and 
Hindus joined it.4 In 1936-37 the ?raja Sabha, the first 
at least nominal peoples' representation , was 
inaugurated by the Maharaja, and in 1944 there were 
partial elections to this body. In the mean-time another 
semi-political organization, the Anjuman-e Mushaekh, 
had come up; most of its members were loca l or 
regional Muslim spiritual leaders-both Kashmiri and 
non-Kashmiri. In 1939 the Muslim Conference was 
turned into the National Conference (NC) with an 
explicitly secular and socialist manifesto. By this time 
close links had been established between the NC and the 
larger sub-continental struggle for independence-
notably the Indian National Congress. This in turn led 
many-including Ghulam Abbas-to break away from 
the NC and revive the Muslim Conference in 1941 . 
Most who left were, like Ghulam Abbas, Muslims 
from south of the Valley. They lived in a Hindu 
majority area and much more than the Muslims of the 
Valley, who lived in a Muslim majority area, they 
perhaps feared being politically swamped by the Indian 
National Congress, which they perceived as representing 
a Hindu India. 
By 1947 there were thus various well formed 
streams of identity in Jammu and Kashmir as a whole. 
In the Valley feelings of Kashmiri identity rather than 
identity along religious lines dominated. This was clear 
when the Muslim Conference lost out in popularity to 
the NC even during Hindu feudal rule. With the de-
colonizing of South Asia these identities were now , 
logically enough, paired with the concept of self-
determination. The latter, conceived of unequivocally as 
3 At this stage this local Congress was not recognised by 
the Indian National Congress. 
4several Gujar and Bakkarwal joined this because they felt 
more comfortable in a party which was not numerically 
dominated by Kashmiris. Similar reasons led many of them 
to be involved later with the Praja Sabha. By doing so they 
demonstrated their willingness to compromise and co-
operate with the state, while nevertheless being part of a 
·movement of protest. This strategy, commonly resorted to 
among "minorities" in many societies, remains an oft 
misunderstood and misinterpreted hallmark of the Gujar and 
Bakkarwal in Jammu and Kashmir. 
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independence, was brought up, first and foremost, by 
Hari Singh, the last Hindu Maharaja. 
De-Co lonization, Partition and the Conflict 
In 194 7 there were roughly 500 princely states in 
South As ia governed according to the principle of 
"paramountcy", i.e . the assurance that the British would 
defend them against all foreign invasions. With the 
independence of British India this principle became 
irrelevant and these states were given the option of 
·acceding to either India, or Pakistan, or of remaining 
independent and managing their own defense. Most 
decided to join either Pakistan or India, but there were a 
few exceptions. Hyderabad's Muslim ruler and a largely 
H indu population, Jodhpur's Hindu ruler and mostly 
Hindu subjects, Kashmir's Hindu ruler and an 
overwhelmingly Muslim population wanted to continue 
as independent rulers.s 
Jammu and Kashmir had for many centuries 
entertained close trade and intellectual links with Punjab 
(both western and eastern, now in Pakistan and India 
respectively) and other areas in these two countries. 
Hence Hari Singh approached the future rulers of both 
these states-to-be with proposals that would guarantee 
him his throne and power. In July 1947 while the 
Muslim Conference urged him to join Pakistan, India 
did not respond, largely because Jawaharlal Nehru was a 
personal friend of the Maharaja's arch enemy Sheikh 
Mohammad Abdullah, who had been leading the "Quit 
Kashmir" movement against Hari Singh since May 
1946. Hari Singh now entered into a "standstill 
agreement" with Pakistan. Shortly thereafter, however, 
a number of events took place that were to drastically 
impinge on this agreement: 
1. An armed revolt erupted in Poonch in summer 
1947 primarily by local Sudhans, aided by Pashtuns 
from the North West Frontier Province and actively 
supported by officers of the new Pakistani army. This 
rebellion was, however, not couched in terms of 
re li gious affiliations, and indeed the commanding 
officer, Mohammad Zaman Kiani, had been a high 
ranking officer in the patently secular Indian National 
Army led by Subhas Chandra Bose (Bose 1997). 
2. The influx south of the Valley of hundreds of 
thousands of Hindu and Sikh refugees fleeing the 
horrendous atrocities in western Punjab and the North 
West Frontier Province was seized upon by members of 
the locally well organized militant Hindu fundamentalist 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) to massacre just 
5Much threatening, bargaining and blackmailing 
accompanied the delineation of the Indo-Pakistan 
boundary. Well known cases are those of Junagadh and 
Manavadar, both of which acceded to ·Pakistan, and of the 
Hindu Maharaja of Bikaner (with his mainly Hindu 
subjects) who threatened to join Pakistan ra ther than India 
were his demands not complied with. 
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as many local Muslims, while the Maharaja's Hindu 
police looked the other way. 
3. On October 4 th as streams of hapless 
Hindu, Muslim and Sikh refugees struggled to barely 
survival and Hari Si ngh's predicament grew deeper, a 
secular and anti-feudal group, appalled at the Maharaja's 
agreement with Pakistan , fo unded a Prov ision a l 
Peoples' Repub lic of Jammu and Kashmir . This 
independent repub lic, headed by Ghul am Nabi G il kar 
lasted just 20 days however, losing control to pro-
Pakistani elements on October 24. 
4. On 25 th October several thousand Pashtun 
(mostly Afridi) tribesmen, organized by the Chief 
Minister of the North West Frontier Province and led by 
a few former Indian National Army officers, now 
integrated into the Pakistani army, and by a handful of 
Western mercenari es inv aded the Kas hmi r Valley, 
ostensibly on a mission to free Kashmi ri Muslims from 
"the Hindu yoke" . Leaving a trail of murder, rape, 
plunder and arson among these very Muslims, they 
advanced up to about 50 km. of Srinagar. 
With his small army routed, the Maharaja called for 
Indian help. India made Kashmir's accession to the 
Indian Union a condition. On 26th October 1947 Hari 
Singh signed the Instrument of Accession and the 
following day Indian troops landed in Srinagar. India and 
Pakistan fought their first war over Kashm ir . 
Meanwhile the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front 
(JKLF) formed with the aim of freeing Kashmir from 
both Indian and Pakistani rule. When Kashmiris today 
speak of "regaining freedom", they refer to the rather 
technical freedom of 73 days (from August till October 
1947), which followed on 358 years of absorption 
consecutively into the Mughal empire, the Afghan, 
Sikh and Dogra kingdoms, and finally the British 
empire. 
The finality of Jammu and Kashmir's accession to 
India was, however, unmistakably conditional to 
ascertaining the peoples' wishes. India took the stand 
that the people, not a feudal ruler, should decide, and 
that such a decision, irrespective of whether it was based 
on religious or other criteria, must be binding. In 
Jammu and Kashmir the peoples' wishes could not be 
ascertained at the time, so the ruler's wishes were 
accepted temporarily. India thus accepted Hari S ingh's 
decision as tentat ive, to be confirmed or rev ised by 
ascertaining the wishes of the people of Kashmir 
through a plebiscite. Various arguments and opinions 
have been put forward regarding this promised plebiscite 
under UN auspices; it suffices here to note that it has 
not been held. Following the United Nations cease-fire 
declaration in 1949 Jammu and Kashmir were split in 
two parts: roughly 65% to the east and south of the 
cease-fire line controlled by India and roughly 35% to 
the west and north of it contro lled by Pakistan, which 
later ceded a small portion to China. T he portion under 
indirect or direct Pakistani contro l consists of Azad 
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Kashmir and Northern Areas, inhabited mostly by non-
Kashmiri Sunni Muslims, with Shias in pockets. The 
portion under Indian control consists of three areas- (a) 
the Kashmir Valley, inhabited overwhelmingly by 
Kashmiris (largely Sunni, with Shia and Hindu 
minorities), but also by a variety of non-Kashmiri 
Sunni (Gujar, Pathan, Punjabi, etc.) and Sikhs; (b) the 
area to the south of it peopled by various mostly Hindu 
communities and many Sikhs, but also with a very 
strong non-Kashmiri Muslim minority (Gujar,6 Rajput, 
etc.) and pockets of Kashmiri Sunni; (c) Ladakh (cf. 
Rizvi 1996 for an overview). 
A 'New Kashmir', Contradictions and 
Conflict 
Between 1949 and 1953 the movement for social 
justice continued. With the abolition of feudal rule, land 
reforms were the first major step taken by the N C 
government under Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah as 
Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. Other sweeping 
reforms that he undertook in trying to build a "New 
Kashmir" (Naya Kashmir) in the fields of taxation and 
education also went down very well with most 
Kashmiris, who were unspeakably poor. But they 
antagonized wealthy Hindus and Muslims, who 
found their positions of socio-economic power 
increasingly threatened. Especially the land reforms 
which vastly benefited the rural masses-mostly 
Muslims in the Valley and lower-caste Hindus to the 
south of it -generated much discontent among the rural 
gentry of both religions. In the towns the N C 's 
popularity remained high, largely because of Abdullah's 
adherence to the charter of kashmiriyat. The articulation 
of opposition to Abdullah and his policies was hence 
limited, and could not be couched in the idiom of social 
justice. Since, however, Abdullah was unequivocally 
secular, opposition could be couched in terms of 
religion-be this Islam or Hinduism. As mentioned 
earlier, politics and religion did not traditionally mix 
well in the Valley, but they certainly did to the south of 
it. With Partition, while Islamic influence decreased, 
that of Hindu organizations increased. While in the 
Valley people waited impatiently for the promised 
plebiscite to finally decide the future of Jammu and 
Kashmir, to the south, in the name of Indian 
nationalism the virulently communal and socially 
obscurantist Praja Parishad and the fascist Rashtriya 
Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS) whipped up fear among 
Hindus and Sikhs about renewed atrocities by Muslims, 
were a plebiscite to take place. They built up a plank 
against self-determination for the region, equating all 
demands for self-determination with a demand for a 
Muslim state. 
6Another allied community, the Bakkarwal, migrate 
annually with their herds between the Valley and the areas 
south of it and even go into Ladakh (Casimir and Rao 1998, 
Rao 1995, 1998). 
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Largely to pacify these elements who wer"e ga ining 
influence in the central government the so-called "Delhi 
Agreement" was signed in July 1952. It spelled out the 
mutual limits of authority of the Kashmiri and Indian 
states and reneged on the promised plebiscite. 
Essentially, therefore, it ignored the principles of 
democracy and justice and denied the ethos of 
kashmiriyat; it was never accepted by the majority of 
the Valley's population, and Sheikh Abdullah now 
started speaking more openly of "self-determination" and 
"full autonomy". All vestiges of democracy were finally 
shed in 1953 with his dismissal by the Indian 
government on August 3th and with his arrest and 
incarceration on charges of treason till 1968. 
Co-opting and the Lure of Money: The 1960s 
and 1970s 
While the new government ruled with Indian help , 
those who had been in favor of Abdullah joined together 
with many who had increasingly opposed him for his 
own undemocratic ways to form the Plebiscite Front in 
1958 . It is widely opined that this is when many 
Kashmiris first started looking to Pakistan for 
sympathy. With Abdullah's arrest and the threat of an 
intensified movement towards both social justice and 
self-determination looming large, India adopted a new 
double-pronged policy of co-opting potential 
opponents? and their families economically while 
crushing dissent. 
Co-option 
Given its small population, the Valley had a very 
dense structure of cross-cutting ties between trade, 
officialdom, artisanship, cash crop 
agriculture/horticulture-and politics. Hence, not only 
those who favored independence, but even those who 
felt that Kashmir should be part of Pakistan, and these 
included many among the Muslim landed gentry and the 
urban mercantile class, were-as individuals and 
families-part of these networks. These opponents of 
the government were now co-opted into the system of 
economic benefits, primarily through the subsidies 
provided by India8. The result was massive corruption, 
to which, however, little moral opprobrium attached, 
since the money that flowed in was considered "Indian 
money". This policy led to the emergence of a middle 
class which could not afford to be openly anti-India, 
while participating in a sullen but peaceful opposition 
to Indian rule. How passive this opposition was is 
evident from the meager response in 1965, during the 
second Pakistan-India war, to Pakistan's call to 
7rncidentally, Abdullah and Nehru had proceeded in this 
manner a few years earlier faced with the Ladakhi demand 
for self-determination (van Beek 1998: 39). 
8While in 1950-51 only 3.7% of the revenue was 
contributed by India, by 1970-71 this had risen to over 
56.29%-and was to rise further to 72% by the end of the 
1980s (cf. Ganguly 1997: 74, Tab. 4.1). 
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Muslims not to collaborate with Indian troops9 . It was 
this same middle class which played a key role in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, first in electoral opposition 
and then in the armed struggle. 
Economic ga ins went hand in hand with political 
power and this in tum was now increasingly based on 
communi ty -spec if ic sentiments. Till 1947 influenti al 
men of all communities had acted as mediators and 
middlemen between their respective communities and 
other larger units at various levels of the socio-political 
hierarchy. With the advent of the electoral system these 
middlemen gradually became leaders of "vote banks". 
These functioned as vertical chains of patrons and 
clients , integrated into networks composed of these 
patrons, local politicians and a variety of men who 
made their money from various not entirely legal 
activities and acted as what Srinivas and Beteille 
( 1964: 167) have in another context termed 
"contractors". Cutting across such localized networks 
the wealthy and po li tically ambitious and influential 
now increasingly formed interest groups which could, 
however, function on the broader platform of regional 
politics only by projecting themselves and being 
projected in terms of community allegiance. Right from 
the start in post-colonial South Asia, collective identity 
couched in "cultural" terms was blatantly used for 
electoral purposes. In India " ... caste form[ed] an 
important criterion in the selection of candidates ... " 
(Rao and Rao 1974: 454-55), so also did religion, while 
in Pakistan sectarian and tribal affiliations were 
exploited (Orywal 1Y98). Inevitably then, especially 
from the late 1960s when politics in India came to be 
conce ived of increasingly " .. . as essentially an electoral 
game" (Kothari 1985: 5) " .. . the numbers game 
essentially became an ethnic game" (Kothari 1985: 7). 
In this "game" in Jammu and Kashmir also both 
religious feelings and affiliations and non-religious 
cultural traditions were used to make and break the rules 
and all political parties tried to determine the players. 
The emergence of "vote banks" led to economic 
resources being converted into political resources and 
finally, a clear consensus being created between 
economic power within the community and political 
representation in the wider framework by using sets of 
cultural features to temporarily create political 
affiliation . All this took place in a political context in 
which every Muslim resident of the region was expected 
to "prove" his allegiance and loyalty to a state which 
was increasingly demanding monolithic identities and 
affiliations and rewarding these by greater access to a 
network of resources. 
Economic gains had percolated down to the villages, 
as was evident from vast improvement in food 
9The existence of resentment is clear from the fact that 
among those who did help Pakistan were the sons of 
certain middle class families - and that some of these very 
men are long back in positions of administrative power in 
Kashmir. 
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availability, clothing and communication. Yet, wi th 
population growth and few new employment 
opportunities in the countryside migration to urban 
areas continued and the number of unemployed, res tive 
youth grew. G iven the government's progressive 
education policy, very many of these young men had 
higher formal education and considered themselves to be 
highly quali fiedlo. Jobs were, however, limited: there 
was no local industry worth the name, Indian industry 
could not and did not invest in Kashmir, Kashmiri 
Musl ims did not like to leave the Valley to take up jobs 
elsewhere, and finally, they felt discriminated against in 
recruitment to the "central (Indian) services". 
Crushing Dissent 
While at the day to day level, corruption, 
inefficiency and the machinations of the governments in 
Srinagar and Delhi effectively placed issues of social 
justice on a back burner, all organized political 
opposition was muffled and draconian laws were 
promulgated to deter it. Not only was Maqbool Butt, 
one of the major leaders of the JKLF hanged 11 • but 
local opposition parties were banned or intensely 
harassed, and even Indian parties opposed to Congress 
rule in Delhi-such as the left of center Praja Socialist 
Party-were prevented from putting up candidates. Most 
later participants in the armed insurgency of the 1990s 
were arrested as teenagers for demonstrating, pelting 
stones at Government agencies, shouting "anti-Indian" 
or "pro-Pakistani" slogans. Hundreds of such young 
mostly working-class Kashmiri Muslims used to be 
almost routinely arrested, manhandled and humiliated. 
Especially in northern Kashmir youngsters were picked 
up as suspected spies and tortured (pers. comm. of an 
Indian security officer, 1988). A later General Secretary 
of the JKLF recalled: "While still in school I joined Al-
Fatah, a pro-independence group, which simply wanted 
to remind both India and Pakistan, peacefully, [about 
the plebiscite]. I was arrested for the first time in 1971. 
I was 18 and spent nearly six months under 
interrogation; we were forced to remain stark naked, 
while our persecutors joked about our circumcised 
penis" (interview published in a Srinagar newspaper, 
1990). In the aftermath of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war 
many Gujar and Bakkarwalliving near the Indo-Pakistan 
cease-fire-line south of the Kashmir Valley were killed 
and hundreds had to flee westwards into Azad Kashmir 
when their huts were torched by Indian army personnel, 
on mere suspicion of collaboration with Pakistan (pers. 
~~here was a tremendous growth in literacy rates between 
1961 and 1981 and an equally dramatic jump in higher 
education (cf. figures in Ganguly 1997: 32-34, Tab. 2.1 -
2.3; these figures do not, however, distinguish between the 
Valley and other parts of Jammu and Kashmir). 
II He was sentenced for murder in 1968, broke jail in 1969 
and was rearrested and then hanged in1984 largely in 
retaliation for the murder of an Indian diplomat by another 
JKLF member in Britain. 
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comm. of several eye-witnesses and of M.M. Khajuria, 
later Director General Police, Jammu and Kashmir). 
By the mid 1960s the idea of Kashmiri nationalist 
resistance had grown with the impact of events outside 
South Asia, such as the successful Algerian fight 
against French colonialism, the Vietnam war and the 
Palestinian struggle. But it was above all the continued 
harassment, persecution and complete suppression of 
basic democratic rights of all Kashmiri Muslims who 
dared to openly air their opposition to the doings of 
those in power which became the driving force of this 
resistance. 
In 1972, one year after the third Indo-Pakistan war 
and the formation of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan 
signed the "Simla Accord", thus officially retracting on 
the promised plebiscite and explicitly blending out the 
wishes of the people of Kashmir. In the same year 
while members of the largely secular Plebiscite Front 
were arrested and debarred from standing for elections, 
the orthodox Jama'at-e Is/ami (JJ) 12 was ensured a 
victory against the NC in five seats by the Congress, 
which declared itself a winner in 57 of the 74 seats . 
Apparently the notions of kashmiriyat and self-
determination were perceived as more dangerous to 
Indian rule than Islamic fundamentalism. Politically the 
JJ remained weak and even in 1977, in the first and last 
fair and free e lections in Jammu and Kashmir it won 
only one seat. But it was working so lidly in the rural 
areas with the help of fundamentalist preachers brought 
in from Bihar and after the horrendous massacre of 
Muslims at Nellie, from Assam. In rural areas many 
parents sent their children to schools run by the JJ, 
since State-run schools often existed only on paper. 
Banned in 1975 by Sheikh Abdullah who was once 
again in power by now, these schools openly inculcated 
fundamentalist Islam and hatred and contempt of 
Hindus. The emotive appeal of Islam was growing and 
increasingly even the NC thought it expedient to appeal 
to Islamic, and even pro-Pakistani sentiments in its 
election campaigns. Two major reason for the growing 
political appeal of religion should be mentioned: with 
Sheikh Abdullah's release and re-election people had 
looked forward to a relief from oppression, but this was 
not to be. With the Jammu and Kashmir Safety 
Ordinance and the Public Safety Bill in 1977 and 1978 
respectively the government severely curtailed press 
12The JJ in Kashmir is ideologically close to the pre-
Partition J I founded in 1941 by Maulana Abu! Ala 
Maudoodi, who advocated the idea of Nizam-e Mustafa-a 
system which he felt would be in tune with what had existed 
when the Prophet ruled-and held that Pakistan, tholl;gh a 
Muslim state, is yet to become truly Islamic. The parent JJ 
split in 1947: The Indian branch came under Deobandi 
influence and focussed on Muslim culture, while the 
Kashmir branch took on an ambivalent and opportunistic 
posture between Pak istan and India. Its current head himself 
stood for elections to the Jammu and Kashmir state 
assembly several times, but is now the chairman of the 
APHC. 
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freedom, thereby blocking just about the only 
remaining means of expressing disagreement. Secondly , 
all hopes pinned on Abdullah died, as he turned out thi s 
time to be e ve n less democrati c than before , and in 
addition nepoti sti c and corrupt. As a res ult , sec ul ar 
ideals were increas ing ly questioned- to many Is lam 
offered an alternative set of ideals. 
Pr elude to Armed Militancy - The 1980s 
The developments in the previous phase impacted 
different communities and sections in Kashmi r 
differently, but they all revolved around the access to 
resources, the perception of which was also c hanging 
rapidly. The late 1970s and 1980s witnessed increasing 
migration among profess ional Muslims to the Gulf 
countries and to the West. The resulting remittance 
economy created a nouveau riche section of Kashmiri 
Muslims whose opulent life style was disapproved of 
by large sections of the conservative urban working and 
lower-middle classes, most of whom had at least some 
forma l education. Many of these nouveau riche were 
employed in that section of the Sri nagar tourist industry 
which catered to Western tourists. For this entire 
portion of primarily Srinagar-based, Kashmiri Muslim 
society, the role models were non-Indian, and contempt 
for things Indian increasingly and necessarily came to 
pair with resentment and mistrust. The ready cash 
available a lso led to a great deal of land speculation and 
a rapid spread of urbanization. While socio-economic 
disparities among Mus lims and discontent grew, the 
Muslim middle and upper classes, firmly entrenched in 
positions of economic power, asp ired to greater political 
power. 
Ind ian reaction now changed from appropriation to 
open confrontation. The Congress in Delhi, with its 
intensely undemocratic and divide and rule policies 
towards all non-Congress ruled areas, encouraged local 
fissile tendencies and used these for electoral gains. In 
Jammu and Kashmir, ruled by the NC with a primarily 
Kashmiri backing, this meant emphasizing differences 
between the Kashm iri-linguistically the majority 
population in the Valley on the one hand - and all non-
Kashmiri (primarily the minority -cluster of Gujar, 
Bakkarwal and "Pahari "-cf. Rao 1999) as well as 
between Muslim and non-Muslim. This inevitably 
implied an open attack on the concept of kashmiriyat 
which was meant to embrace all commun ities of the 
region. 
Between 1933t3 and 1986 the Valley had witnessed 
no communal riots, not even during the P artition of 
I3Jn 1932 Srinagar witnessed riots between Kashmiri 
Muslims and Kas hmiri Hindus and "many pandit famili es 
migrated to Sri nagar from the villages" (Times of India , 
September 26, 1932). During one of the hearings of the 
·Glancy Commission a Gujar had testified that when he went 
to sell milk in a Hindu home he had been allacked; another 
witness said how he had seen three Gujar being dragged to a 
temple by Hindus and then killed (KRC 1932: 43 , 46). 
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1947; yet, ever since the Mughal Emperor Shah Jehan's 
time an uneasy co-existence had characterized Muslim-
H indu relations. With hi s decree prohibiting 
intermarriage between the two communities, common 
till then, soc ial intercourse was greatly reduced. Now 
three hundred years later in public speeches Indian 
po liti c ians, including Indi ra Gandhi , harped on the 
re li g ious differences between Kashmiri Muslims and 
Hindus. Increasingly thereafter Kashmiri Muslims 
began to be exc luded from key posts in the local 
administration and the savage massacre of Hindus in 
1986, engineered it is widely fe lt by the Congress, was 
probably part of this policy of driving the wedge deeper 
be tween the various communities. An overall 
atmosphere of great mistrust between urbanized 
Muslims and Hindus developed. The latter were being 
increasingly viewed by the former as pro-Congress, 
hence pro-India and by the same token anti-Kashmir. 
Unquest ionably, Pakistani propaganda echoed this 
theme and fueled these sentiments. Educated Hindus, in 
their turn, began to feel threatened by Muslims and even 
discriminated against by the government of Jammu and 
Kas hmir; many began to emigrate to India. The 
government's reaction to the growing restiveness of 
large sections of Kashmiri Muslims was twofold: to 
wish it away by interpreting it as "anti-Indian" feelings 
created entirely by Pakistan and to counter it by 
stimulating the perception of threat among Kashmiri 
Hindus. This process led slowly but steadily to 
Kashmiri identity becoming synonymous with 
Kashmiri Muslim identity . 
Kashmiris, whatever their faith, increasingly tended 
to try and find solace in rather fundamentalist forms of 
their respective religions, and a population which was 
still aware of its largely joint cultural identity grew 
increasingly conscious of the only part of this identity 
which was potentially divisive-religious identity. 
Recalling Gellner's observation (1981), a conflict which 
was basically between the haves and the have-nots got 
channeled, not into class conflict, but into a conflict 
that was interpreted in "ethnic" and "religious" terms. 
While Islamic fundamentalist organizations, largely 
abetted and funded by Pakistan's Inter Services 
Intelligence (IS/), tutored and preached orthodox and 
often downri ght fundamentalist Islam, their Hindu 
counterparts tried to inculcate monolithic "Hinduism". 
In the years that followed, the invasion of Afghanistan 
by the Soviets ("India"s friend") 14 , their subsequent 
defeat the re, the Iranian revolution, the rise of the 
Central Asian republics with their Muslim populations 
and nearer home the S ikh movement for Khalistan 
14T he fact that India did not condemn this invasion also 
had far reaching consequences for Kashmir. Condemning 
India for its stand, the Afghan Taleban, for example, have 
till recently been supporting and imparting military 
training to men of the Harkat-ul Ansar (see Note 17 below). 
It is rumored, however, that clan-oriented/ideological 
splits within the Taleban 9which was never as homogenous 
as made out to be) are impacting this support. 
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encouraged Kashmiri Muslims to increasingly conceive 
of politics and nationalism in general and their own 
empowerment in particular in terms Islam. An exactly 
parallel movement went on, especially to the south of 
the Valley, where the equally obscurantist and fanatic 
forces of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and the Bharatiya 
Janata Party instilled and incited hatred and contempt 
among Hindus , in the name of a new nationalism. 
Consciously and for political purposes, several streams 
of identity and affiliation were thus being rejuvenated, 
created, stimulated or strengthened-Kashmiri vs. non-
Kashmiri, Muslim vs. Hindu, etc. In the midst of all 
these "cultural" issues what never got mentioned in 
public political discourse were the issues of growing 
economic stratification and of political power being 
increasingly perce ived almost entirely as an income-
generating resource for individuals and small groups 
who had access to it. 
Increasingly the younger generation felt that the 
older struggle led by the NC had not palpably liberated 
the people from repressive structures and brought them 
social justicels. With the NC after Sheikh Abdullah's 
death giving in unabashedly to blackmail and terror by 
the Congress in Delhi, most Kashmiri Muslims looked 
in vain for an alternative. But armed militancy was still 
a far cry. As a later JKLF Commander recalled, "In 
1982 we first distributed cassettes of Maqbool Butt 
together with some movies of guerrilla warfare and war 
in Afghanistan, but the response was very poor. Even 
in 1987-1988 when we again tried to contact youth 
... we had just ten to fifteen guns, but [there was] no 
response. We were given the treatment of untouchables, 
nobody was sympathetic" (Interview published in a 
Srinagar newspaper in 1990). 
A Decade of Armed Violence 
The fraudulent elections of 1987 dealt the final blow 
to non-militant politics. When the Muslim United 
Front (MUF), a conglomeration of opposition groups 
for which some 60% Kashmiris cast their vote was 
declared defeated, most Kashmiri Muslims felt that 
parliamentary opposition had no chance, that justice 
was unattainable without "self-determination" and 
separation from India. Waves of strikes, assassinations, 
bomb blasts, kidnappings and arson hit the Valley, 
peaking in 1990. The components of the MUF formed 
militant wings (A/ Barq, AI Fateh, AI Jehad, etc.), with 
ISHence many militant organisations tried to ban the 
government celebration of July 13 as Martyrs' Day, which 
used to commemorate all those who died in the struggle 
against the Dogra cum colonial regime. In recent years, the 
APHC has tried to co-opt this ritual by holding parallel 
celebrations. Rejection of the older struggle was also 
manifested in attempts to desecrate Sheikh Abdullah's 
grave and in threats issued to elderly Kashmiri Muslims 
who had participated in that movement to face the 
consequences if they did not return the awards and pensions 
they received from the government in recognition of their 
earlier involvement. 
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weapons that were, not surprisingly, funded almost 
entirely by Pakistan's IS/. Thousands of youth took up 
arms in order, as one of them says, to "convey to the 
conscience of the world, and to Indian conscience in 
particular, that we Kashmiri people want to be heard" 
(Malik 1998). The first of these grew into the armed 
wing of the J KLF, which began by recruiting four 
young men (the so-called HAJY group) as the first 
batch of trainees. The armed youth trained by the IS/, 
belonged to urban families who had not managed to 
penetrate the existing economic networks; they were 
potentially dangerous, not only to the Indian state, but 
also to the economic fabric of Kashmir. There was 
growing potential for a violent movement in search of 
not just political but also socio-economic justice, a 
movement based not on religious, or ethnic allegiances, 
but on contesting the appropriation of resources by a 
chosen few. 
While the /S/ trained and armed them, these young 
men proclaimed that the duty of every Kashmiri was to 
fight a jehad for social and political justice. This 
justified extortion, kidnappings, forcible entry into 
Muslim homes, and even torture; for if one was not 
ready to take up arms, or give one's son or younger 
brother to the armed movement, one should at least 
pay 16. Road blocks to collect "donations" for a variety 
of militia (many gave receipts) or for a local mosque 
were the order of the day. All this led to resentment 
among wealthy Muslims, many of whom began to 
leave the Valley and stay in India or in the West. It also 
ultimately led to numerous factions and even gun 
battles within and between the militia. The overall 
result was an atmosphere of intense fear and a collapse 
of the productive part of the economy. Yet there was no 
shortage of cash. Apart from Indian subsidies which 
continued unabated, with every call by the militants for 
a strike-and these were very frequent-shop owners 
and tradesmen were compensated, as they still are, by 
IS/ funds. 
Aspiring to political power, the Muslim middle 
class had little choice but to support the insurgents, and 
internal socio-economic contradictions were set aside, 
first in the name of kashmiriyat and then, following the 
principle of fitna, in the name of Islam. The call for 
jehad did, very briefly, bring together Islamism and 
kashmiriyat, till then perceived as incompatible, but it 
also augured the death-knell of kashmiriyat. The call 
blared forth at night from numerous mosques in 
December 1990, coupled with some brutal killings of 
Kashmiri Hindus, threats at gun point to many others, 
and a clear Indian campaign to depict the entire issue as 
a Muslim-Hindu conflict terrified the vast' majority of 
Kashmiri Hindus into accepting Indian help to·flee the 
16Butchers, grocers, etc. who traditionally kept monthly or 
even seasonal accounts of their customers' dues were 
favoured sources of information regarding a household's 
consumption patterns and hence also about _its income and 
other features. 
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Valley and live in squalor and misery to the south. With 
their exodus- or "mi gration" as it is ambiguously 
referred to in official parlance-the conce pt of 
kashmiriyat died. Another reason for its demise was that 
Srinagar was also largely populated by wealthy Muslim 
Punjabis-, many of whom favoured accession to 
Pakistan, rathe r tha n ind e pe nde nce . T o th e m 
kashmiriyat meant littl e . A thi rd factor was that 
increasingly, powe r within the militant g roups was 
slipping into the hands of people from outside the 
Valley (mostly Azad Kashmiris) who were not 
culturally Kashmiri; finally , for reasons of historica l 
and political expediency all groups continued to claim 
to fight for the whole of Jammu and Kashmir, not just 
the Valley-in other words also for the non-Kashmiri 
populations (cf. Puri 1987: 836, Rao 1999). The 
culturally binding force could then only be Islam. Last, 
but not least, the mystically-oriented Islam typical for 
the Valley and part and parcel of kashmiriyat was 
frowned upon by the IS/ and most of the other funding 
agencies. In 1990 this aspect of kashmiriyat had been 
used by the J KLF when, in the presence of some 
300,000 people, their leaders vowed at the shrine of 
Nur-ud Din, known to Muslims as Alamdar-e Kashmir 
and to Hindus as Nand Rishi, to lead Kashmir to 
independence. In May 1995 this sufi shrine was largely 
destroyed in fighting between Indian troops and Harkat -
ul Ansar l7 militants, who had placed bombs within the 
shrine 18. 
Gradually then, the term kashmiriyat was dropped 
from the official discourse of the insurgents and more 
militant Islamic terminology (e .g. jehad, mujahid, 
shahid, Nizam-e Mustafa ) took its place. Conservative 
religious practices also increased, though attempts to 
compel women to veil, men to attend Friday prayers, 
wear beards and ban smoking failed. Numerous West 
Asian style mosques (as opposed to local Kashmiri 
styles) sprang up, women's hair dressing saloons, girls' 
schools and cinema houses were forcibly closed, 
women's colleges burned, and bands of armed young 
17This pan-Islamic militant organisation was formed 
between 1991 and 1993 with the merging of the Pakistani 
Harkat-ul Jehad-a/lslami (set up in 1980 by the Jama'at-e 
Ulema lslami- a virulent opponent of the 11- first as an 
aid group for Afghan refugees in Pakistan and then to 
recruit and train youth to fight the communist government 
in Afghanistan) and the Tehrik-ul Mujahidin. It does not 
recognise territorial frontiers dividing Muslims and was 
officially declared a "terrorist group" by the USA due to its 
alleged involvement in the World Trade Centre bombings; 
to facilitate continuing financial transactions it has since 
renamed itself Harkat-ul Mujahidin .In an attempt to 
pressurize India to release Masud Azhar*, one of its main 
ideologues, who was arrested in February 1994 while 
illegally crossing into Kashmir, one of its sub-groups, AI-
Faran, kidnapped and held hostage six Western tourists in 
1995; it is believed that most of them were killed. 
18since 1991 at least thirteen Muslim shrines in the 
Kashmir Valley have been attacked and even destroyed. 
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men combed the lanes and bye-lanes to check on proper 
behaviour. 
From 1990 onwards, while subjecting Srinagar to 
more than 100 days of uninterrupted curfew, India 
brought in some 400,000 military and paramilitary 
forces, who not only engaged the militants in open 
battle, but shot all suspects point blank and resorted to 
most brutal physical and psychological repression . 
Armed with supreme powers these forces indulged in 
unspeakable atrocities and humans rights violations, 
· which have been documented by many independent 
Indian and international organizations, including 
Amnesty International (e.g. Asia Watch 1991, IPT 
1997, Rao 1991 ). In the following years most of the 
Valley's 1.5 million Muslim families grieved over 
some member killed, tortured, or raped; thousands were 
detained without trial, thousands disappeared without a 
trace . Hundreds of houses were plundered during "search 
operations" and "crack downs", innumerable families 
faced blackmail, extortion, and humiliation. 
Islamic militia too were on the ascendant from 1990 
onwards, when the anti-Soviet Afghan leader Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar called for jehad against India on August 
14th, and by 1993 the issue of independence got further 
complicated with the JKLF, with secular claims being 
increasingly overshadowed both in military and financial 
might by groups intimately connected to Islamic 
fundamentalist groups. Notable among these was the 
Hi zb-ul Mujahidin (H M), the armed wing of the 
lama' at -e Is/ami, which is ideologically close to 
Pakistan. Unlike the JKLF who aim at the independence 
of the whole of Kashmir from both India and Pakistan, 
when HM members spoke of independence they meant 
joining Azad Kashmir, which is nominally independent 
(azad) but de facto a part of Pakistan (e.g. Kreutzmann 
1996: 243). Also unlike JKLF activists, who are 
predominantly urban, those of the HM are largely rural, 
or at least have strong rural connections. Perhaps 
realizing that the grip of the JKLF was fast slipping, 
Amanullah Khan, one of its founders, tried in June 
1990, amidst most brutal state repression, to form a 
shadow cabinet for an independent state of Jammu and 
Kashmir. He invited not just Kashmiri, not just 
Muslims, but also the son of the last Dogra Maharaja 
to join. Within the Valley a handful of urban Hindus 
had also been members or sympathizers of the JKLF; 
their roughly 300, 000 members in Western countries 
included Mirpuri, Kashmiri, Gujar and people of several 
other communities mainly from Azad Kashmir. 
Amanullah's efforts met with little positive response; 
instead there arose over the next few months a plethora 
of armed groups: Allah Tigers, AI-Umar Mujahidin*, 
Hi zhullah, Jkhwan -ul Mujahidin, lkhwan-ul Muslimin, 
etc. With arms and money flowing in, internecine shoot 
outs and even mutually inflicted torture and murder in 
the Valley grew out of proportion. In May 1990 the 
H M shot and killed the then Mirwaiz of Kashmir, 
because he opposed accession to Pakistan; later in a 
show of strength it vied with the JKLF in occupying 
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the Hazratbal mosque, one of Srinagar's major mosques. 
By 1993, several non -Kashmi r i Muslims from 
Afghanistan, Sudan, Palestine and Yemen owing 
allegiance to the Harkat-ul Ansar had entered the scene, 
and the JKLF- which still spoke of independence, 
rather than accession to Pakistan- had stopped receiving 
Pakistani help. Yet its members continued to refer to 
the portion under Pakistani control as "free Kashmir" 
(A zad Kashmir) and that under Indian control as 
"occupied Kashmir" (Maqbu za Kashmir) . This 
terminology is still in use. By 1996 higher rates of 
service and compensation were being paid to the non-
Kashmiri militants and their families than to Kashmiris 
who had largely earned themselves the reputation of 
being less committed fighters. 
While the families of many militants- irrespective 
of group allegiance- fled to Pakistan, middle-class 
families increasingly emigrated, caught between the 
Indian forces and the insurgents. The less wealthy went 
to India, the wealthier to the West, to Cyprus, etc. With 
schools and colleges hardly functioning- a large 
percentage of the teachers had been Hindus- Kashmiri 
Muslim children went to study in India, and with the 
exodus of Hindu doctors increasingly Muslims who 
could afford it also went to India for treatment (and till 
today Y as in Malik, the JKLF head, is regularly attended 
to by a Kashmiri Hindu doctor in Delhi). 
After Pakistani financial help to the JKLF ceased in 
favour of the HM the former became a prime target of 
the latter, and to survive it declared a unilateral cease-fire 
in 1994. This led to greater peace in the Valley, but 
also to yet another split within the JKLF, with many of 
its men continuing to fight under the auspices of other 
organizations (currently the Harkat-ul Ansar or the 
Lashkar-e Toiba 19). Soon after, to curb militant in-
fighting many militant and opposition groups joined to 
form a common platform, the All Parties Hurriyat 
Conference (APHC ), with the objective of pressing for 
a plebiscite. Whatever its popular image may be20 this 
19This is a wing of the Jama'at-e A hi-e Haditlz and is 
closely linked to the Markaz-ul Dawa-u/lrshad. The latter 
was founded in 1987. Funded by Pakistan, its members are 
trained by the IS/ in Afghanistan (in camps near Khost), 
Pakistan and Azad Kashmir (in camps near Kotli and 
Muzaffarabad). 
20-rhe APHC has earned itself the reputation of being 
extremely corrupt, and its major leaders-many of whom 
stood for elections in earlier years, even as Congress 
candidates-of having ill-gotten wealth. While most of 
this money comes in from Pakistan, some comes from Iran, 
as in the case of Abbas Ansari, a Shia leader, and a great 
deal comes from Kashmiri (and Azad Kashmiri) diasporas in 
the West and Middle East. When the first round of Indo-
Pakistan talks began in 1998 and many Kashmiris 
demanded that their representatives be allowed to 
participate, Pakistan said it would speak on their behalf. 
Pro-independence protests in Kashmir was muffled and a 
complete strike prevented by the APHC, which in return 
received a large pay-off from Pakistan. While the IS/ and 
other Pakistani organizations campaign for the APHC both 
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demonstrates that there are no clear lines between 
"fundamentalist" and "non-fundamentalist" groups-
simply shades of grey, that represent varying strategies 
based on different aspects and degrees of faith and 
desperate attempts to fulfill personal commitments to 
principles of specifically Islamic justice. These are the 
very princ ipl es that are instrumentalised by a variety of 
organizations and institutions- the 11, the lUI, the IS/ 
- to fight their own battles. 
Conclusion: The Simmering Volcano 
A decade of brutal state repression, violent resistance 
and massive foreign interference have left a deep mark 
on every section of the increasingly fractured social 
fabric of the whole of Jammu and Kashmir. Continuing 
with its policy of divide and rule, the government 
recruited Kashmiri Hindus as translators/interpreters in 
interrogation cells and members of various non-
Kashmiri Muslim communities either as informers or 
as members of armed counter-gangs (e.g. Vinayak 1994; 
Sidhva 1995).21 Individual Gujar were also recruited to 
help the government plan the elections of 1996 in 
Jammu and Kashmir, in which, it is now generally 
accepted, the people were physically forced to vote (e.g. 
Balagopal et al. 1996). But the extent to which even the 
seemingly united Kashmiri Muslim society in the 
Valley has been impacted is clear from the frequency 
with which Indian security forces have been called upon 
by individual Kashmiris to intervene, threaten and 
harass fellow Kashmiris with whom they have some 
personal score to settle. The massive deployment of 'ex-
militants'22 or 'counter-insurgents' as members of the 
government's Special Task Force and Special Operation 
Group licensed to raid any house, pick up anybody for 
interrogation and even summarily kill anyone suspected 
of being anti-government is partly possible due to this 
social rupture and is also exacerbating it. Pakistan's role 
as savior has increasingly been questioned, and many 
young militant leaders are no longer heroes, as is 
locally and internationally (e.g. through numerous internet 
sites), it should be noted that the APHC is neither 
homogenous, nor do all its constituents fovor joining 
Pakistan. 
2tTwo major such outfits are composed of Gujar. One, the 
Talihan (not to be confused with those of Afghanistan), 
originally formed by a major Gujar politician to protect 
himself and his family from attacks by anti-India militants 
and living off smuggling timber, operates mainly in 
tandem with the Rashtriya Rifles, an unit of the Indian 
security forces. The second such outfit, the Muslim 
Liberation Army, is known to be close to the Congress. 
Both groups are very at:tive in identifying and suppressing 
all anti-government activities. 
22These ex-militants subscribe to no particular ideology 
and had either surrendered or deserted their respective 
groups because of pecuniary considerations or prolonged 
inter-group fighting . Many Kasmiris also say that some of 
these men are members of the NC, who were recruited by 
Indian Intelligence agencies to penetrate militant networks 
and even sent to Pakstan for military training. 
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evident from the problems they are having in findin g 
suitable wives . However, all this does not mean that 
any section of the population of Jammu and Kashmir 
merges its identity with that of the Indian state ; India is 
hated, as perhaps never before. 
As of writing , the Indo-Pakis tan war in Karg il is 
over and fresh elections are due in Septem ber 1999 , 
with the National Conference , the Congress, a ne w 
party the Peoples' Democratic Party and other smaller 
parties joining the fray; the APHC has, predictably, 
called for a boycott, though there are strong rumours 
that there is much disagreement about this within their 
ranks (there were certainly many in the JKLF who 
wanted to participate in the 1998 elections but were 
overruled by the leadership). In the last elections in 
Jammu and Kashmir in 1998, where people voted much 
more voluntarily than in 1996, the official battle lines 
were drawn between the National Conference on the one 
hand and various other parties on the other. Electoral 
tactics seemed a complex mixture of attempts at access 
to resources, preservation of identity and basic survival. 
A Kashmiri Muslim, Abdul Rashid Kabli, contested 
from Srinagar as a candidate of the Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP) which openly represents communalist 
Hindu sentiments, while another Kashmiri Muslim , 
Deen Mohammad Cheeta, formerly of the National 
Conference, who left the Valley a few years ago for 
Jammu was also the BJP's candidate from Baramulla. In 
other parallel developments the BJP had successfully 
recruited ex-militant Kashmiri Muslims in the Valley 
who, it is said, were refused tickets by the National 
Conference because of their unusually brutal past23; the 
JKLF also claimed to have received in its folds a couple 
of ex-BJP members in the Jammu region . 
There are few open battles now in the Valley, but 
draconian laws (e.g. Ronga 1999), indiscriminate 
killings, torture and rape continue, as do attacks by 
militants (roughly 60% pan-Islamic and non-Kashmiri) 
on military and other government installations and cash 
flows and propaganda from Pakistan. India and Pakistan 
are apparently still not convinced that there can be no 
military solution to 'the Kashmir Problem'. In India, 
even those who condemn human rights violations by 
the state rarely conceive of the Valley's separation from 
India, and especially after the Kargil war few are critical 
of the Indian forces, not only for their brutality, but 
also for their massive corruption (timber trade, pay offs 
for supplies, rumored sale of ammunition, etc., to 
militants, etc.). The legal system has practically 
collapsed and very few of those incarcerated for years 
have been put on trial; even those who have been tried 
23These are men who first belonged to the militant outfit 
lklnvan-ul Muslimin under the leadership of the dreaded 
Yusuf ("Kuka") Parray and were then recruited by the 
· government as "counter gangs" (e.g. Sidhva I 995) or 
"counter insurgents"; they have now formed the A wami 
League which was supported by the 81 P in the elections of 
1998. 
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and found innocent have been rearrested on fresh 
charges . The Kashmir Government c laims that 
"normalcy" has been largely restored, and indeed, on the 
surface it has-this time with the active and brutal help 
of rural ex-militants and with enormous sums of cash 
doled out by India as pay-offs to powerful individuals, 
groups and even entire villages. 
In Kashmir there is a growing sense of betrayal by 
Pakistan, especially after the Kargil withdrawal, and to 
maintain cred ibility Pakistan must keep up the pressure. 
·Most Kashmiris still speak of their dreams of "self-
determination" and the estab lishment of a society that is 
"in keeping with Islamic values". The definitions of 
both terms defy political expediency and regional and 
global econom ic and power networks. Terminologically 
they symbolize the near impossibility of reconciling the 
various idioms that have marked the struggle in 
Kashm ir: Islamic values, Kashmiri identity and justice. 
Justice in Kas hmir can not be attained along religious 
categories, especially if the whole of Jammu and 
Kashmir is considered. Kashmiriyat and Islam 
apparently also do not pair well, nor can a specific 
Kashm iri identity be valid for all the communities in 
the area24 . Till Kashmiri leaders of various political 
persuasions have the maturity and honesty to come to 
terms with these contradictions and stop simultaneously 
blackmailing India and Pakistan while playing into their 
hads for short-term benefits, "self-determination" will 
for those who have known only injustice and 
humiliation remain a diffuse, though increasingly 
violent longing for a more equitable world. 
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